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Electoral manifestos play a crucial role in visions of party democracy and political science analyses of
party competition. While research has focused on the contents of manifestos, we know much less about
how parties produce manifestos and the roles they take in campaigns. This paper identiﬁes three
campaign-related functions of manifestos: they provide a compendium of valid party positions,
streamline the campaign, and are used as campaign material. Based on the characteristics of the can-
didates, the parties and the campaign, the paper then derives expectations of how party candidates may
differ in attributing importance to their party's manifesto. Based on a candidate survey after the 2013
Austrian general election, the paper shows that the key user-group of parliamentary candidates con-
siders manifestos generally important and useful documents. Candidates' policy-centred campaigning
and lefteright distance from their own party are important in explaining individual differences. While
the manifesto's service functions of providing a summary of valid party positions for the candidates and
as a campaign means to be handed out to voters are widely appreciated, campaign streamlining is more
divisive when it results in constraining candidates.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The stylized version of party democracy puts great emphasis on
parties' policy programs as structuring the campaign, voters'
choices, party coalition building, and government policy. Parties
then ﬁght elections rallying behind a manifesto, laying down policy
priorities and positions, and a team of leaders committed to them.
The victorious party takes government ofﬁce and implements its
policy program. In cases of coalition cabinets, government policy is
expected to be some kind of compromise based on the policy
programs of the participating parties. In the subsequent election,
voters will not only judge parties according to their policy pro-
grams for the next term in ofﬁce, but also retrospectively, focussing
on the government's performance and scrutinizing if the parties
have kept their promises (see, e.g., Dalton et al., 2011).
The importance of parties' policy programs is reﬂected in the
attention political science has given to them. Indeed, electoral
manifestos have become ubiquitous in political science analyses.t, University of Vienna, Roo-
ny).
Ltd. This is an open access article uThis is largely due to the regularity with which parties dutifully
produce these documents, and the constant effort of the Compar-
ative Manifesto Project (now MAPOR) in turning these texts into
data (Budge et al., 2012; Budge et al. 1987; Klingemann et al., 2006;
Volkens et al., 2013). This ongoing research program has not only
provided the discipline with widely used data, but has also led to a
burgeoning methodological debate (Laver, 2001; Volkens, 2007;
D€aubler, 2012; Laver and Garry, 2000; Benoit et al., 2009;
Gemenis, 2013; Budge and McDonald, 2014). Substantively, it is
all about the issues that parties emphasise (salience) and the po-
sitions they take. While there is more to be found in party mani-
festos than salience and positions (Dolezal et al., 2016), we see the
greatest research gaps not in the analyses of manifesto texts. To
begin with, it is not at all clear what manifestos actually are, that is,
how manifesto positions e regardless of their measurement e
relate to post-election politics. Laver (2001: 67), for instance, dis-
tinguishes between ideal policy positions (representing the party's
true convictions), stated policy positions (party ideals adapted to
what the audience is considered willing to buy), and policy fore-
casts (what the party claims it will achieve if endowed with gov-
ernment power). Similarly, Ray (2007) sees manifestos as either
rather abstract statements of parties' identities and philosophies,nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Finally, Harmel et al. (2016) suggest that (voter-directed) party
image projection and (party members-directed) identity-building
are the core functions of manifestos. Based on manifesto content
analyses, they ﬁnd that there are trade-offs between the two.
Answering this research question empirically, requires infor-
mation on manifestos’ impact on post-election politics. Thanks to
pledge scholars, who study how speciﬁc party claims translate into
government programs and actual policy (Royed, 1996; Thomson,
2001; Naurin, 2011; Schermann and Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014),
and other students of the partyegovernmentepolicy nexus (Budge
et al., 2012; Dalton et al., 2011), considerable progress has been
made in this research front.
Yet, all other aspects of party manifestos have hardly been
touched upon by research. One such lacuna relates to the process of
writing these manifestos. Only few studies have addressed this
topic (Dolezal et al., 2012; D€aubler, 2012; Switek, 2015).
Perhaps the greatest gap exists with regard to the precise role
manifestos play in the campaign for which they are written. The
present paper addresses this gap, focussing on how party candi-
dates view and use their party's manifesto. To the best of our
knowledge, it is the ﬁrst study on how target ‘manifesto users’
conceive and use this document that is ubiquitous in political sci-
ence (see, however, Kercher and Brettschneider (2013: 277e279),
who report a survey of German party members).
We focus on the case of Austria, speciﬁcally the 2013 general
election. Austria has a typical European multi-party system with a
broad range of parties in terms of ideology, organization, and age.
We develop and empirically test hypotheses relating to the char-
acteristics of candidates and manifestos. We also discuss the rele-
vance of party characteristics such as government status, age or
performance in the polls, but due to multicollinearity concerns we
exclude them in multivariate analyses. Clearly, there are limits to
the generalizability of results relating to one country and one
election. Yet, we believe that the expectations and ﬁndings of our
study are also applicable to other countries and elections that share
similarities with the Austrian one.
The paper proceeds as follows: First, we discuss the functions
manifestos fulﬁl in parties' campaigns. Next, we develop expecta-
tions about when designated manifesto users, the party candidates,
are more or less likely to attribute importance to the manifesto. We
then present data and methods before we turn to empirical anal-
ysis. We ﬁnd the manifesto's functions of providing a summary of
valid party positions and as a means to be handed out to voters, are
widely appreciated. These are the manifesto's service functions.
The manifesto's function of streamlining a campaign is more divi-
sive among candidates, in particular when it results in constraining
candidates about what they should say. The degree of policy-
centred campaigning by candidates, and their lefteright distance
from their own party, are particularly important in explaining dif-
ferences between candidates.
2. Manifesto functions
Recognizing that only few voters read party manifestos, the
literature has provided a number of arguments why manifestos
‘nevertheless do constitute the major indirect inﬂuence on what
parties are seen standing for’ (Budge, 1987: 18). In the words of Ian
Budge, ‘[t]his is because they form the basis of comment in the
mass media and provide the cues for questions raised with party
candidates at all levels, as well as staple issues for their campaigns’
(Budge, 1987: 18). Manifestos, thus aim for indirect effects, at least,
as much as for direct ones. In the words of Laver and Garry (2000:
620), manifestos are ‘strategic documents written by politically
sophisticated party elites with many different objectives in mind’.We can distinguish, at least, three functions that a manifesto can
serve: provide a compendium of valid party positions, establish
supremacy over all other policy positions that may be attributed to
the party and thereby streamline the party's campaign, and use as a
campaign tool to directly inform voters.
2.1. Compendium of valid party positions
A comprehensive summary of party positions can serve several
purposes: It can guide sophisticated voters, who may work out for
themselves, which party comes closest to their ideal policy pack-
age; it can provide the mass media with input for their reporting;
and it can be a useful tool for party candidates and activists. A
document that provides economic access to how their party sees
the real world, and the resulting blueprints or guidelines for policy
change, is certainly advantageous for those who are responsible for
spreading the party message to the people in face-to-face contacts
in constituencies. Parliamentary work requires MPs to specialize;
similarly, other candidates and party activists are likely to be much
better informed about the policy areas relating to their own back-
grounds and their party's policy, therein, than other domains. Yet,
during a campaign party representatives cannot conﬁne to the
areas of their expertise, as questions on many others may come up
during voter contacts, encounters with journalists, and in direct
confrontations with candidates of competing parties. Hence, a
single document arming politicians for all these situations can be of
tremendous campaign value.
2.2. Streamlining the campaign
Political parties may provide such documents not only to ease
the job of their candidates, allowing them to devote more time to
actual campaigning rather than preparing for it, but also to
streamline the campaign. To begin with, political parties are not
conﬁned to the manifesto in making policy statements. In some
countries, they issue different types of programs (Budge, 1987: 18).
These documents include the ones deﬁning the party's core values
and identity (‘basic programs’), and the ones that provide the
party's policy in a speciﬁc domain (e.g. regarding the economy or
defence). While the former documents typically have little overlap
with manifestos, the latter ones certainly do. Moreover, party
leaders may make programmatic speeches, detailing policy plans
when addressing, for instance, the party congress, and parties
typically take positions on many issues in parliamentary debates.
As actions are often seen to speak louder than words, government
policy, and the accompanying explication of party goals, may be
considered powerful alternative reference points to the contents of
the manifesto. According to Laver's (2001) considerations, referred
to above, these alternative sources of party policy often distinguish
themselves along the principleepractice dimension, have different
time horizons, and may be inﬂuenced by various context factors.
Candidates, thus, may see the electoral manifesto as just one of
many party statements and of no particular signiﬁcance. The claim
of the literature on party manifestos, however, is to the contrary. In
the words of Klingemann et al. (2006: xvi), the manifesto is ‘unique
in being the only authoritative party policy statement approved by
an ofﬁcial convention or congress’. Thus, the more relevant a
manifesto is, themore unique it is in deﬁning the party's policy, and
less so if there are alternative (and probably not fully congruent)
statements of party policy, from which candidates can freely
choose. Manifesto supremacy, thus, means that the manifesto is the
one and only authoritative source of party policy in the context of a
campaign.
The manifesto should not only establish supremacy over alter-
native party documents as a ‘contract with the voters’ (Ray, 2007),
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positions on any given issue within the party. If such intra-party
tensions exist, it is particularly important to have the ‘ofﬁcial
version’ of the party's stance, to which all sides in the internal
debate conform during the campaign. This is important, as ‘any
great divergence from the line taken by the majority of candidates
will be noted by, amongst others, opposing candidates who will
make capital out of this sign of dissension’ (Robertson, 1976: 52). A
party that ‘creates the impression of incoherence and unreliability’
(Robertson, 1976: 51) certainly carries a competitive disadvantage.
Hence, it is the collective goal of a party that candidates conform to
the common party line, and thus preserve the party's brand name
(Aldrich, 2011; Snyder and Ting, 2002). The manifesto is then the
edict of party positions, and the candidates understand that
departing from the party line will damage them collectively. This
function of the manifesto is the more important the more in-
centives candidates have to seek a personal vote (Carey and
Shugart, 1995; De Winter and Baudewyns, 2015; Eder et al., 2015;
Selb and Lutz, 2015). Evidence from studying manifesto writing
suggests that the positions taken in these documents are carefully
elaborated, and aim at combining electoral appeal with intra-party
acceptance e maybe at the price of some ambiguity (Dolezal et al.,
2012; D€aubler, 2012). Thus, campaign streamlining means that the
manifesto is actually constraining what individual candidates,
organizational units, and intra-party groups say during the
campaign.
2.3. Campaign material
In campaigns, political parties and candidates are often
generous in providing voters with printed material. The giveaways
at gatherings of target groups, street contacts, or canvassing,
include ﬂyers, candidates' photographs, little presents carrying the
party label, and all types of programmatic statements. Depending
on the manifestos’ format and the audience, the latter may include
the party manifesto or, if available, a condensed version of it.
2.4. Compulsory exercise
Publishing a manifesto in each election is a time-honoured ac-
tivity that parties are widely expected to undertake. The presen-
tation of the manifesto to the public is a symbolic act that often
signals the beginning of the campaign's hot phase. As such, it
guarantees some media attention for the party and its ideas.
Although the absence of a manifesto presentation event might lead
to snide remarks in the press and a missed opportunity to motivate
the party rank-and-ﬁle for the campaign, we can easily think of
alternatives as a symbolic campaign start such as the presentation
of (selected) candidates or a specially advertised speech of the party
leader. A manifesto having a function reduced to a kind of
compulsory exercise for the party, would thus not be considered
particularly important.
Manifestos are then particularly important documents e and
hence would conform to the political science attention to this type
of text e the more they meet the ﬁrst three of the criteria listed
above. If, on the contrary, writing a manifesto is only a type of
compulsory exercise for parties, it would be of lower status. How-
ever, note that there are potential tensions between the three
important tasks of manifestos. In particular, providing a compen-
dium of all valid party positions may not result in a document that
can be handed out to most voters. We also note that manifesto
functions are not equally demanding on the candidates themselves.
Some are more a service the party provides (compendium of valid
party positions, campaign material), while campaign streamlining
constrains candidates, and may indeed handicap them inaddressing individual target groups. A manifesto, thus, may not
possibly live up to all these tasks simultaneously andmay still be an
important document well worth analysing.
3. Hypotheses
When will party candidates consider manifestos relevant with
regard to the functions widely attributed to these documents? We
expect that individual characteristics of candidates, manifesto
properties, and party characteristics impact how party candidates
attribute functions to the manifesto.
3.1. Candidate characteristics
3.1.1. Policy-centred campaigning
There are different ways candidates can appeal for voter sup-
port. They can focus on their group membership, their past con-
stituency services, the leadership qualities of the party's top
ofﬁcials, or on the party's policies. Clearly, real world candidates
cannot evade any of these, but can try to focus, more or less, on
these components. We reason that candidates with strong policy-
centred campaigns ﬁnd party manifestos more relevant than
those who tend to concentrate on other ways to appeal to voters.
3.1.2. Lefteright distance to own party
The greater the distance of candidates from the positions taken
by their own party, the less they should value and care about the
manifesto.
3.1.3. Chance to get elected
Individual candidates may also make their own choices with
regard to the manifesto. Given that some of these documents are of
book length and are often not written in the most readable style,
working through them is costly. It is therefore worth considering
the candidates' individual incentive structure. We reason that
candidates who have a greater chance of being elected (because
their party will be in parliament, and they are running for a
reasonably safe seat) are more likely to carry these costs. Also
candidates who see themselves as future policy-makers should
attribute more relevance to their party's central policy document
than candidates who will not be in such a position.
3.2. Manifesto characteristics
Manifestos differ greatly in their length and readability (Benoit
et al., 2009; Dolezal et al., 2012). We expect the suitability of
manifestos, as a campaign means directly handed out to voters, to
decrease as their length increases and readability decreases (Merz
and Regel, 2013; Kercher and Brettschneider, 2013).
3.3. Party characteristics
3.3.1. Ideology
With regard to ideology we relate to the greater programmatic
tradition of parties of the left. This is also reﬂected in the relevance
of manifestos. It means taking time to carefully elaborate them,
producing more substantial documents, legitimising them by party
congress vote, giving them an important role in the campaign, and
using them as the blueprint for government policy (Dolezal et al.,
2012). We, therefore, expect candidates of left parties to consider
the manifesto more relevant than those from parties of the right
(that traditionally have been more pragmatic and leader-oriented,
see Epstein, 1967).
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Recent research has shed light on the differences between old
and new parties that seem particularly relevant in the present
context (Bolleyer, 2013; Beyens et al., 2016). New parties lack
institutionalization. Part and parcel of the institutionalization
process are routinization and value infusion (Bolleyer, 2013;
Levitsky, 1998). In the most general terms, routinization means that
an organization's members can draw on precedents, and increas-
ingly on party rules, to guide their behaviour. Value infusion means
a ‘shift in followers’ goals from the pursuit of a particular objective’,
via the vehicle of a party, to the goal of perpetuating the party as an
organization (Bolleyer, 2013: 16; Levitsky, 1998: 79). New parties
are short of routinization and value infusion; their representatives
lack stored information on party positions onwhich they can draw.
Party candidatesmay have beenmotivated by a single issue or a few
issues, rather than information on and agreement with the party's
positions across the board. The manifesto, then, should be an
important means to provide information to the candidates, and to
ensure that they do not contradict each other during the campaign.
In contrast, representatives of old parties can draw on party history
and, very often, their own personal experience will provide can-
didates with many cues about the positions their party takes, so
that the manifesto may be less relevant for them as a compendium
of valid party positions. These candidates may also have a good
intuition of how to handle issues that are ‘sensitive’ internally.
Thus, they may also see less need in a streamlining device.
3.3.3. Inclusiveness of manifesto writing
Here our argument borrows from the literature of candidate
selection, which distinguishes between inclusive (i.e. participatory)
and exclusive (leadership-directed) processes for such selection
(Hazan and Rahat, 2010). Inclusive processes of manifesto writing,
allow broad participation of the rank-and-ﬁle during the drafting
process, and formal decision-making by intra-party referendum or
party congresses. We reason that more inclusive manifesto writing
leads to manifestos of greater internal acceptance, and hence
relevance to the candidates (though not necessarily to voters, see
Adams et al., 2011; Spies and Kaiser, 2012).
3.3.4. Party government status
Much more policy-relevant information is available about gov-
ernment parties than opposition parties, and hence government
parties may ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to ensure the centrality of the
manifesto. Candidates will be confronted with such evidence in the
campaign, and thus cannot afford to focus exclusively on the
manifesto. Moreover, government parties often shy back from
making ﬁrm policy commitments in their manifestos, while op-
position parties may feel less constrained (Dolezal et al., 2012). The
reasons behind these choices are that government parties, on the
one hand, may want to avoid being asked why they had not already
acted on these issues during the term that just ended, and, on the
other hand, may not want to be too ﬁrmly constrained when
returning to government. All this suggests that the manifesto is
likely to be less important for the candidates of government parties.
3.3.5. Party performance
In a post-election survey, a party's electoral performance may
inﬂuence the answering behaviour of candidates. Those of under-
performing parties may identify their party's (unattractive) mani-
festo as a factor that contributed to the disappointing result, while
candidates of over-performing parties are likely to adopt a friend-
lier attitude.
As our empirical application covers seven parties in a single
election, the set of manifesto and party characteristics discussed
above over-determines the patterning of the data. We wouldrequire data from several elections to conduct a proper statistical
test of the relative impact of macro-level variables. Therefore the
multiple regression models in the next section focus on the
explanatory power of individual-level characteristics. The models
include no party characteristics apart frommanifesto length, which
is enough to identify a candidate's party afﬁliation.
However, descriptively we will show the values of these mani-
festo and party variables (in Table 1 below) and their bivariate
relation with an index of manifesto importance (Fig. 2). We do not
consider our results a test of the theorized manifesto and party-
related factors, but rather a ﬁrst check on their plausibility.
4. Data and methods
To increase our knowledge about the importance of manifestos
in the campaign, and to provide a ﬁrst check on the plausibility of
our hypotheses, we draw on a candidate survey conducted in
Austria following the 2013 parliamentary elections (Müller et al.,
2016). All 3946 candidates were mailed a questionnaire shortly
after the election. We limited our statistical analyses to the candi-
dates of the seven parties with parliamentary representation, either
before or after the election (N ¼ 3204). These were the Social
Democratic Party (SP€O), the People's Party (€OVP), the Freedom
Party (FP€O), the Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZ€O), the Greens,
Team Stronach (TS) and New Austria (NEOS). The BZ€O had been in
parliament before the election, but failed to gain seats. Team
Stronach and NEOS ran for the ﬁrst time and entered parliament. In
contrast to NEOS, Team Stronach was represented in parliament
even before the election, as the new party that had been founded
outside parliament attracted MPs who had split off from the BZ€O.
The response rate of candidates from the seven parties was 31
percent (n ¼ 992). The representativeness of the sample with re-
gard to gender is excellent. The sample exhibits a minor over-
representation of the Green Party and minor underrepresentation
of the FP€O, a minor overrepresentation of candidates aged 50 years
and older and underrepresentation of candidates younger than 40
years and a slight overrepresentation of candidates with an aca-
demic degree (see Table A-1 in the appendix).
A number of survey questions focused on the electoral mani-
festo, probing into the candidates’ reading of the document, and its
importance in the campaign. The following statements e some in
the form of negations e aimed to elicit nuanced responses on
manifesto functions:
 The electoral manifesto is an important source of information
for candidates on the positions of their own party.
 The electoral manifesto is just one of many sets of political
statements of my party during the campaign, and has no
particular signiﬁcance.
 The electoral manifesto is a summary of valid party positions,
from which candidates must not deviate.
 The electoral manifesto is well suited to be distributed directly
to voters.
 Publishing the electoral manifesto is a compulsory exercise, but
it is not particularly useful for the campaign.
In addition to these more general statements, the survey asked
them to evaluate the 2013 electoral manifesto's content, more
speciﬁcally (‘The electoral manifesto of my party did not contain
much information on topics that became important during the
campaign.’). Candidates could rate each statement on a ﬁve-point
scale ranging from ‘agree strongly’, ‘agree somewhat’, ‘partly
agree and partly disagree’ to ‘disagree somewhat’ and ‘disagree
strongly’. In the analysis, we ﬁrst show the percentages for agree-
ment, ambiguity or disagreement with a statement, and then build
Table 1
Party and manifesto characteristics.
Party Greens SP€O NEOS €OVP TS BZ€O FP€O
LR position: mean
(0 left, 10 right)
2.5 3.0 5.3 5.8 5.9 6.2 7.5
Government status Opp Gov Opp Gov Opp Opp Opp
Newness Old Old New Old New Old Old
Inclusiveness
(1 highest, 7 lowest)
2 4 1 3 7 6 5
Party performance
Previous election e election 2013 2.0 2.5 5.0 2.0 5.7 7.2 3.0
Pre-election poll e election 2013 0.6 0.8 5.0 1.0 9.3 1.5 2.5
Electoral manifesto
Length:
sentences 2989 1052 1310 1444 226 340 159
words 41,086 15,186 18,009 18,686 2243 4234 1512
Readability:
Flesch scorea
10 10 7 10 28 29 22
Note: a To calculate the Flesch score we used the website http://www.leichtlesbar.ch (Bachmann, 2014). A high Flesch score indicates good text readability.
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ments with the most consistent answers.
Our dependent variables include ordinal (the agreement scale)
and interval data (the Likert index). We use OLS regression for the
index and generalized ordered logit (Fu, 1998; Williams, 2006) for
the ordinal variable. The latter does not depend on the ‘parallel
regression’ assumption of the ‘common’ ordered logit regression
model (Long, 1997; Greene and Hensher, 2009). The assumption
stipulates identical slopes for the ordered levels, but often fails in
empirical tests. The table of regression coefﬁcients in the appendix
lists more than one beta coefﬁcient for a covariate. Model estima-
tion was performed in Stata 14 using the gologit2 package
(Williams, 2006). Regression modelling was performed without
using imputation for cases withmissing scores. Thus, the number of
cases is lower in the multiple regression models.
The hypotheses presented in the previous section relate to
characteristics of candidates, manifestos and parties, which con-
stitutes a hierarchical data structure (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002).
We include binary party variables as ﬁxed effects, but except for
manifesto length no party-level characteristics are included in
multivariate analyses. We had no particular expectations for addi-
tional candidate characteristics such as gender, education and age.
They were included simply as control variables. Continuous vari-
ables are standardized by dividing the values by two times their
standard deviation to put the beta coefﬁcients of these variables on
the same scale as the coefﬁcients of binary variables (Gelman,
2008).
Table 1 provides some context information on the Austrian party
system and the 2013 campaign, Table 2 the descriptives of candi-
date characteristics subsequently used in the multiple regression
models. The party's lefteright position is the mean of candidates'
locating their ownparty on an eleven-point scale. There are two left
parties (Greens and SP€O), and ﬁve parties located from centre-right
to the right (NEOS, €OVP, TS, BZ€O and FP€O). Government (1) versus
opposition (0) indicates each party's status before the election;
newness is whether a party is running for the ﬁrst time (1) or not
(0) in a national election. Two indicators measure the parties'
performance in the 2013 campaign. One is more long-term and
compares a party's previous election result of 2008 to its result in
2013 (difference in vote shares). For the new parties, Team Stronach
and NEOS, it is the 2013 election result. The other measure relates
to the short term, and shows the improvement or decline from the
level of support a party held half a year before the election
(measured as the difference between the potential share in a poll,
ATV €Osterreich Trend/Hajek, 22 March 2013, n ¼ 1000) and the
actual vote share in the election.
In terms of the inclusiveness of manifesto writing, Austrianparties had a rank-order from Team Stronach, the foundation of the
octogenarian entrepreneur Frank Stronach (the least inclusive), to
the other newly founded party NEOS. The NEOSmanifesto had been
put together in a very broad participatory process involving its
members and registered party sympathizers. The inclusiveness
variable negatively correlates with manifesto length: the more
exclusive the process of writing a manifesto the shorter was the
text presented in the election of 2013 (Pearson r ¼ 0.85 with both
sentences and words). Although we note the theoretical relevance
of this characteristic, we only use manifesto length. Manifesto
length is given as the number of sentences and words, which, as it
turns out, are perfectly proportional (Pearson r ¼ 0.999). We
selected the number of sentences for the regression models. The
Flesch score is a measure of text readability (Flesch, 1948;
Bachmann, 2014), with higher values indicating better readability.
The lowest values in Table 1 are at the level of the readability scores
of academic papers.
From the candidate survey, we selected the following list of
individual characteristics: Policy-centred campaigning indicates
how strongly a candidate emphasized the party's ‘program’ in his or
her campaign activities. The chance to get elected is based on his or
her own subjective expectation prior to the election. Distance to
own party is the gap between a candidate's own position on the
lefteright scale, and his or her location of their party on this scale.
The remaining three variables e Education, Age and Female e are
socio-demographic control variables.
5. Results
We begin by showing how many candidates have actually read
their party's electoral manifesto. Next, we present to what extent
the manifestos of the seven parties lived up to the functions
generally ascribed to them. We then proceed from bivariate ana-
lyses to multiple regression modelling.
5.1. Reading the electoral manifesto
Table 3 summarizes whether and how carefully candidates read
their party's electoral manifesto ahead of the campaign. The can-
didates' reading of these documents strongly varies by party.
Overall, most of them recorded that they had read the manifesto, at
least parts of it. This, of course, is the normative expectation can-
didates may be reluctant to deviate from by admitting that they did
not read their own party's electoral manifesto. Three percent of the
€OVP candidates, and about the same percentage of SP€O and Green
candidates, nevertheless, stated that they had not read the electoral
manifesto. Careful reading of the complete manifesto was most
Fig. 1. Agreement and disagreement with manifesto-related statements.
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Team Stronach and NEOS, as well as among BZ€O candidates. €OVP
and Green candidates were most inclined to partial careful reading.
The pattern is suggestive and slightly surprising at the same time.
The high share of new party candidates reading the electoral
manifesto carefully may be due to the lack of information stored by
the candidates or information shortcuts about their party's stance.In contrast, candidates from old parties can draw on a party history
of well-known, entrenched policy positions or party records in
government ofﬁces, to compensate for not reading the party's latest
electoral manifesto. Extrapolating policy positions from the past
provides an estimate of what the party stands for in the current
election.
The BZ€O excluded some prominent politicians from its list of
Fig. 2. Bivariate boxplots of manifesto importance.
Note: The ﬁrst ﬁve panels show bivariate boxplots of predicted values of the manifesto importance index with covariates included in the regression model, the remaining four show
covariates that were excluded due to multicollinearity constraints.
N. Eder et al. / Electoral Studies 45 (2017) 75e87 81candidates ahead of the 2013 election, and tried to re-position itself
as an economic liberal party oriented towards small businesses. The
party's re-positioning may have motivated enlisted candidates to
carefully read the manifesto. A potential explanation for the low
percentage of candidates of the €OVP, who read the complete
manifesto, is the party's factional character. The €OVP's ambition is
to represent a broad spectrum of social and economic groups (‘the
people’), and frequently participates in government. Its electoral
manifesto is expected to cover all policy areas, but in the eyes of
various intra-party groups and their representatives these policy
areas vary strongly in importance. At ﬁrst glance, and somewhat
surprising, is the low share of careful readers among Green can-
didates, given that they stand for a leftist party (i.e. a party with
greater programmatic tradition) and many of them are highly
educated. Yet, we should not forget that the Greens also published,
by far, the longest manifesto of all parties, which may have
discouraged Green candidates from reading it carefully.
5.2. Manifesto functions
What are the functions ascribed to electoral manifestos, and
what is their overall signiﬁcance for party candidates? To answer
these questions, we refer to manifesto-related statements that
candidates could agree or disagree with. Simplifying the ﬁve-point
scale, we present the percentages for agreement and disagreement
in the upper part, and the percentage of ‘partly yes, partly no’ an-
swers in the lower part of each panel in Fig. 1 (see also Table A-2 in
the appendix).The ﬁrst item asks whether the party's electoral manifesto
constitutes an important source of information for candidates on
the party's policy positions. An overwhelming majority across
parties agreed. For these candidates, the electoral manifesto fulﬁls
the function as a useful compendium of valid party positions. The
next two items deal with the manifesto's role as a streamlining
device. Ninety-one percent of NEOS candidates, but only 55 percent
of €OVP candidates disagreed with the statement ‘The election
manifesto is just one of many sources of political statements of my
party during the campaign and has no particular signiﬁcance’. For
an additional 29 percent of the €OVP candidates, it was partly true.
The next statement establishes a strict benchmark: ‘The election
manifesto is a summary of valid party positions, from which can-
didates may not deviate’. Candidates' opinions split across parties
into sizable camps of pro, contra and ambiguous. A relativemajority
of the candidates of Team Stronach (47 percent), the FP€O (44), BZ€O
(40) and SP€O (35) agreed, whereas a plurality of candidates of the
€OVP (44), Greens (42) and NEOS (40) disagreed. Overall, €OVP can-
didates exhibited the most sceptical attitude towards a view that
the election manifesto is a substantive guideline, or even a
constraint, on candidate campaigning. This may reﬂect the char-
acter of a party, in which leaders of factions frequently voice
divergent policy positions (Müller and Steininger, 1994). At the
other end of the spectrum are the Team Stronach candidates. They
showed a highlevel of respect to the electoral manifesto as a
disciplining device, but seemed to acknowledge that headline
grabbing interviews of party founder and ﬁnancier Frank Stronach,
during the campaign, were an additional source of authoritative
Table 2
Candidate characteristics.
Policy-centred campaigning (not at all, a little, fairly, a lot): median Fairly
Chance to get elected (no, low/some, high/safe seat): median no chance
Distance to own party (11 point scales for own/party position): mean (sd) 0.9 (1.1)
Education (secondary, vocational, college, university, academic degree): median College
Age: mean (sd) 47.7 (131)
Female (%) 35.0
N 992
N. Eder et al. / Electoral Studies 45 (2017) 75e8782party statements. Candidates of the other new party, NEOS, held
the electoral manifesto in high esteem, but showed no willingness
to bow to it (see Fig. 1).
The fourth item probes whether a party's electoral manifesto is
suitable for direct distribution to the voters. Candidates may factor
in characteristics of the manifesto, such as length, when consid-
ering its suitability for informing voters about their party's posi-
tions. Relying on the transmission of the party's message via mass
media may appear more attractive, but parties clearly differ in their
a priori chance of getting media attention. According to conven-
tional news value criteria, government parties and large parties,
should do better than opposition parties and small parties. In ﬁve of
the seven parties, a plurality or the majority of candidates saw the
electoral manifesto as a suitable giveaway for voters. The pattern is
intuitive if we look at the differences in manifesto length and
readability. The BZ€O (65 percent agree), FP€O (62) and TS (60) issued
very short manifestos in plain German, whereas the manifestos of
the €OVP (51 percent disagree) and SP€O (46 percent disagree) were
long and more difﬁcult to read. Two parties stand out as odd cases:
almost two thirds of NEOS and 39 percent of Green candidates
considered their manifestos as suitable campaign material for
handing out directly to voters. The manifestos of these two parties
were challenging and long reads, especially the tome the Greens
presented as their manifesto.
Overall, most candidates rejected calling the manifesto a useless
exercise. NEOS candidates overwhelmingly (80 percent) disagreed
with the notion that publishing an electoral manifesto is only a
compulsory exercise.Within the €OVP, agreement and disagreement
was evenly split (36 percent for each). In other parties, disagree-
ment was between 40 to slightly above 50 percent.
The last item invited candidates to reﬂect whether their mani-
festo covered the important topics of the last election. We expect
that the degree of satisfaction with the outcome of the election
might inﬂuence the judgements about a party's campaign
personnel, issues, strategy and means. The result of the election
provided ample reasons for candidates of Team Stronach and BZ€O
to voice discontent ex post. The chaotic campaign of Team Stronach
saw a continuous, steep downward slide in the polls. The BZ€O failed
the 4 percent threshold and dropped out of parliament, while NEOS
was the surprising new party in parliament. Half a year before the
election few observers considered the newly founded party a
serious contender in the national election, and some polls did not
include the party in questions on voting intentions. NEOS candi-
dates uniformly disagreed with the statement that their electoralTable 3
Party candidates reading their party's electoral manifesto (%).
Party NEOS TS
Carefully read the complete manifesto 77.1 65.5
Carefully read parts and glanced over the remainder 22.9 27.3
Skimmed through the manifesto 0.0 5.5
Did not read the manifesto 0.0 1.8
(n) (35) (55)manifesto did not contain much information on important
campaign topics, but 29 percent of Team Stronach, 23 percent of
BZ€O and 13 percent of €OVP candidates strongly agreed. An addi-
tional 41 percent of the €OVP candidates who partly agreed with the
statement, suggest widespread discontent in the party. Partly due
to the success of NEOS, the Greens fared below their own aspiration
level, and despite the party's very longmanifesto a largemajority of
the candidates (79 percent) partly agreed with the statement,
implying a mismatch between the manifesto and the important
issues in the 2013 election.
Our main dependent variable is an additive index from the
candidates' answers. To arrive at that index, we ﬁrst constructed
the Likert index to check on the consistency of the answers. A test of
the inter-item correlations with Cronbach's alpha led us to drop the
statement ‘the election manifesto is a summary of valid party po-
sitions, from which candidates may not deviate’. Alternative
multivariate methods, such as principal component analysis or
factor analysis, also attest that the answers to that speciﬁc item
stand out from the rest, and produce a two-dimensional data
pattern. We also excluded the evaluative statement on the 2013
electoral manifesto, as it is of a less general nature and does not
speciﬁcally relate to one of the theorized manifesto functions. To
create the additive index from the remaining four items, we
reversed the two negations. The index has a Cronbach alpha of 0.67.
Its scale ranges from 0 to 16 points. A candidate with four ‘partly
yes, partly no’ is at the midpoint of 8 points. Higher values indicate
higher appreciation of the electoral manifesto's importance in
terms of the theoretically assigned functions. The mean index
values by party are 9.1 for €OVP, 9.9 for SP€O,10.7 for Greens and Team
Stronach, 11.2 for FP€O, 11.3 for BZ€O and 13.2 for NEOS candidates.
The aggregate values reinforce the ﬁndings from the previous item
by item discussion. NEOS candidates, on average, value the rele-
vance of their manifesto considerably more than the candidates of
the €OVP.5.3. A multiple regression model of manifesto importance
We use the index as a dependent variable and introduce man-
ifesto length, the policy-centeredness of a candidate's campaigning,
the distance to own party and the chance to get elected, as cova-
riates, for which we have some theoretical expectations. Gender,
level of education and age are control variables. Party afﬁliation is
included as ﬁxed effect and standard errors are clustered by party.
Table A-3 in the appendix provides detailed results of the OLSBZ€O FP€O SP€O €OVP Greens
64.9 51.9 40.8 24.9 23.5
23.4 34.6 41.9 47.6 46.3
10.4 12.8 14.7 24.3 27.5
1.3 0.8 2.7 3.2 2.7
(77) (133) (184) (189) (298)
N. Eder et al. / Electoral Studies 45 (2017) 75e87 83regression model, Table A-4 contains party-by-party results. In
Fig. 2, we use the predicted values from the statistical model, and
create bivariate boxplot graphs. Variables that have a large impact
are easy to understandwhen presented graphically. The graphs also
allow displaying results for party-level covariates that due to
multicollinearity were excluded from the statistical model.
The strongest explanatory factors are the policy-centeredness of
the candidate's campaign and the perceived distance to the party a
candidate represents in the campaign. The more ‘programmatic’ a
candidate's campaigning, the more positive is the evaluation of the
electoral manifesto. The larger the perceived gap between the po-
sition of the candidate and the candidate's party, the less important
is the manifesto. Neither the chance to get elected nor any of the
socio-demographic control variables, contribute much to explain
the empirical variation in candidates' appreciation of manifestos.
The length of a manifesto does not seem to relate strongly to the
importance candidates attributed to the manifesto functions, nor
does its readability, a trait that is highly negatively correlated with
manifesto length. Candidates of opposition parties, on average,
seem to hold a somewhat higher opinion of the manifesto than
candidates of the government parties, SP€O and €OVP (1.3 index
points difference). The difference between themean index scores of
candidates from new parties and old parties is about the same, but
the variance of the evaluations within these groups is larger. Can-
didates from parties that performed well, relative to the pre-
election poll results, had a friendlier opinion than candidates
from parties that remained below expectations.
5.4. A generalized ordered regression model of manifesto as a
constraint
We include the same list of covariates in a generalized ordered
regression model with the item that we excluded from the index
(‘the election manifesto is a summary of valid party positions from
which candidates may not deviate’). The variable is recoded in
three categories indicating disagreement, ambiguity or agreement
with the statement. Detailed results of the regression model are
provided in Tables A-5 and A-6 in the appendix. Here we summa-
rize its results as follows: individual-level variables do not account
for much of the variation. The sign of some coefﬁcients makes
intuitive sense, for instance candidates subscribing to policy-
centred campaigning more often express a deference to the man-
ifesto. However, so do candidates who are more distant to their
party's position, which is more difﬁcult to rationalize. The weak
explanatory power of the covariates suggests that the explicit
prohibition on expressing a deviating opinion was a slight to per-
sonal autonomy and peeved a number of candidates from all
quarters.
6. Conclusion
Electoral manifestos are essential documents in political science
analyses. This is attested by the many theories, normative and
empirical, and the large number of studies in which manifestos
ﬁgure either as cause or effect. Yet, we know more about the con-
tents of these documents than how they are written. An even
greater lacuna exists with regard to how key groups of targeted
manifesto users actually view and use this document. This article is
the ﬁrst study to address these questions.
We have outlined four different functions that electoral mani-
festos may fulﬁl. First, they collect a party's policy positions in one
place for easy reference. Second, they streamline the campaign.
This involves, on the one hand, deﬁning and framing the party's key
campaign themes and, on the other hand, containing the populist
impulses of factions or individual candidates who opportunisticallymight want to take a different stance on issues. To the extent that a
manifesto can do both, it helps a party preserve its distinct brand.
Third, manifestos can be used as campaign means to be handed out
to voters. Alternatively, the manifesto may have no particular
importance and can be seen as a compulsory exercise, a recurring
ritualistic element of electoral campaigns.
We ﬁnd that most party candidates consider their party's
manifesto a relevant guidepost in their own campaigning. While
candidates are largely appreciative of the manifesto as a kind of
service their party provides (summarizing party policy positions, a
document to be handed out to voters and providing guidelines for
campaigning), opinions are much more divided about the con-
straining element in campaign streamlining (i.e. ruling out indi-
vidual deviations from manifesto positions). Even when excluding
this divisive item, candidates differ in their appreciation of mani-
festo importance. Candidates who conduct a policy-centred
campaign have a higher opinion about the manifesto than others.
We also empirically show that the degree of substantive congru-
ence between candidates and the party impacts the value attrib-
uted to the party's central campaign document: ideologically more
extreme candidates are less appreciative of the manifesto.
While we cannot conduct a proper statistical test based on data
from a single election, the results do not suggest a strong divide
between leftist parties as being more programmatic, and rightist
parties as being more leadership-oriented and pragmatic. How a
party fared in the election seems to have more impact on candidate
views.
This article is the ﬁrst attempt at studying how target manifesto
users actually view and use these documents in the campaign. It
relates to a single election in one country, and by necessity our
ﬁndings require comparison between systems and elections. Given
the noted importance of manifestos in political science research
comparative efforts of such kind, for instance in the context of the
Comparative Candidate Survey, could be of great use to the disci-
pline. In the present article, we have provided a set of expectations
that could be fully tested and further enriched in such contexts. As
always in a new research ﬁeld, not all of the initial expectations are
conﬁrmed when confronted with data. This, however, does not rule
out that such questions would show relevant differences between
countries if applied comparatively. Nevertheless, the Austrian
experience suggests that careful considerationwould be the orderof
the day. We have not reported here on items probing into whether
andhowcandidates collected informationabout the stances of other
parties (one in ﬁve read rival parties’ manifestos) and whether they
mentioned rival parties, thereby engaging in negative campaigning
in the runup to the election (9 out of 10 candidates did so). We have
also asked a few questions which merit probing deeper in further
surveys. In terms of manifesto writing, for instance, it might be
worthwhile to ask about the participation and early information of
(presumptive) candidates. In terms of manifesto evaluation, in turn,
it might be interesting to ask separate questions about the attribu-
tion of coverage and salience to issues. At a different level, another
extension would be to study how other groups of manifesto users,
such as journalists and societal opinion leaders, view and use these
documents, and how this feeds back to the parties.
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Appendix
Table A-1
Representativeness of the candidate survey.
Absolute Frequency Relative Frequency
Population Sample Population Sample
a) Party afﬁliation
Social Democratic Party of Austria (SP€O) 657 188 0.186 0.190
Austrian People's Party (€OVP) 635 194 0.180 0.196
Freedom Party of Austria (FP€O) 636 135 0.180 0.136
Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZ€O) 331 77 0.094 0.078
Greens (GRÜNE) 904 305 0.256 0.307
New Austria (NEOS) 149 38 0.042 0.038
Team Stronach (TS) 223 55 0.063 0.055
Total 3535 992 1.000 1.000
Duncan-Index of Dissimilarity1 7.13
b) Gender
Male 2260 645 0.639 0.650
Female 1275 347 0.361 0.350
Total 3535 992 1.000 1.000
Duncan-Index of Dissimilarity1 1.09
c) Age group
<30 years 439 105 0.124 0.106
30-39 years 617 145 0.175 0.146
40-49 years 983 274 0.278 0.276
50-59 years 989 287 0.280 0.289
60 years or older 507 118 0.l43 0.182
Total 3535 992 1.000 1.000
Duncan-Index of Dissimilarity1 4.86
d) Education
without academic degree 2429 638 0.687 0.643
with academic degree 1106 354 0.313 0.357
Total 3535 992 1.000 1.000
Duncan-Index of Dissimilarity1 4.40
Notes: 1Duncan-Index of Dissimilarity: 0 [perfect sample representativeness] to 100 [maximum dissimilarity] (Duncan and Duncan, 1955).
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Candidate opinions on electoral manifesto by party (%).
SP€O €OVP FP€O BZ€O GRÜNE NEOS TS
1. The electoral manifesto is an important source of information for candidates on the positions of my party.
agree 83.7 81.4 87.2 85.5 86.8 100 77.8
disagree 4.9 6.4 3.0 11.8 4.4 0 3.7
ambiguous 11.4 12.2 9.8 2.6 8.8 0 18.5
(n) (184) (188) (133) (76) (295) (35) (54)
2. The electoral manifesto is just one of many sets of political statements of my party during the campaign and has no particular signiﬁcance.
agree 14.1 16.1 17.3 17.1 11.6 2.9 23.6
disagree 62.5 54.8 64.7 63.2 70.0 91.4 61.8
ambiguous 23.4 29.0 18.1 19.7 18.4 5.7 14.5
(n) (184) (186) (133) (76) (293) (35) (55)
3. The electoral manifesto is a summary of valid party positions, from which candidates must not deviate.
agree 35.3 23.5 43.6 40.0 32.3 28.6 47.3
disagree 31.5 44.4 21.1 24.0 42.3 40.0 25.5
ambiguous 33.1 32.1 35.3 36.0 25.4 31.4 27.3
(n) (184) (187) (133) (75) (291) (35) (55)
4. The electoral manifesto is well suited to be distributed directly to voters.
agree 27.2 20.3 62.1 64.5 38.9 65.7 60
disagree 45.7 50.8 12.1 9.2 32.8 8.6 20
ambiguous 27.2 28.9 25.8 26.3 28.3 25.7 20
(n) (184) (187) (132) (76) (293) (35) (55)
5. Publishing the electoral manifesto is a compulsory exercise, but it is not particularly useful for the campaign.
agree 27.7 35.8 22.7 21.3 24.3 8.6 32.7
disagree 41.9 35.8 50.8 45.3 52.4 80.0 45.5
ambiguous 30.4 28.3 26.5 33.3 23.3 11.4 21.8
(n) (184) (187) (132) (75) (292) (35) (55)
6. The electoral manifesto of my party did not contain much information on topics that became important during the campaign.
agree 8.2 13.0 7.6 22.7 6.2 0 29.1
disagree 75.5 46.2 78.6 56.0 79.0 100 45.5
ambiguous 16.3 40.8 13.7 21.3 14.80 0 25.5
(n) (184) (184) (131) (75) (291) (35) (55)
Table A-3
OLS regressions of manifesto functions and index.
is an important source of
information on positions
of own party
is just one of many party
statements during the
campaign
is well suited to be
directly distributed to
voters
is a compulsory exercise
but not particularly useful
for the campaign
Index of
manifesto
importance
Manifesto
Length (sentences) 0.06**
(0.01)
0.27***
(0.02)
0.30***
(0.02)
0.11**
(0.02)
0.23***
(0.03)
Candidate
Policy-centred
campaigning
0.53***
(0.04)
0.49***
(0.08)
0.43***
(0.05)
0.45***
(0.05)
1.93***
(0.14)
Left-right distance
to own party
0.15
(0.07)
0.24*
(0.06)
0.11
(0.07)
0.17
(0.12)
0.64**
(0.13)
Chance to get
elected
0.02
(0.04)
0.04
(0.08)
0.18*
(0.04)
0.05
(0.05)
0.27*
(0.11)
Female 0.03
(0.07)
0.10
(0.10)
0.23*
(0.06)
0.17
(0.11)
0.48
(0.24)
Education 0.04
(0.06)
0.11
(0.08)
0.21**
(0.04)
0.16
(0.07)
0.00
(0.21)
Age 0.00
(0.06)
0.20
(0.09)
0.27**
(0.06)
0.16*
(0.06)
0.10
(0.18)
Party controls:
included
Constant 2.64***
(0.20)
1.94***
(0.24)
1.77***
(0.21)
2.32***
(0.16)
8.06***
(0.69)
R2 0.13 0.11 0.23 0.10 0.22
Log Likelihood 1006 1180 1211 1241 1987
n 836 834 835 833 827
Notes: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Table A-4
OLS regressions of manifesto importance by party.
SP€O €OVP FP€O Greens BZ€O TS NEOS
Policy-centred
campaigning
2.07***
(0.50)
1.81***
(0.42)
2.55***
(0.60)
1.85***
(0.34)
2.26**
(0.73)
1.32
(1.13)
1.11
(1.25)
Left-right
distance
to own party
0.67
(0.36)
1.05*
(0.49)
0.46
(0.54)
0.29
(0.36)
0.26
(0.81)
0.70
(0.97)
2.52
(1.73)
Chance to get
elected
0.56
(0.37)
0.21
(0.39)
0.03
(0.47)
0.31
(0.48)
0.12
(0.71)
0.48
(1.20)
0.53
(0.70)
Female 0.25
(0.43)
0.35
(0.43)
0.80
(0.67)
0.79*
(0.38)
0.43
(0.80)
2.67
(1.44)
0.47
(0,97)
Education 0.91*
(0.45)
0.06
(0.45)
0.53
(0.56)
0.45
(0.43)
0.30
(0.70)
1.13
(1.01)
0.13
(1.02)
Age 0.97
(0.54)
0.36
(0.41)
0.19
(0.51)
0.15
(0.38)
0.44
(0.70)
0.59
(1.11)
0.47
(0.76)
Constant 4.21***
(0.76)
8.21***
(1.16)
7.10***
(1.57)
8.46***
(1.14)
8.94***
(2.07)
10.06**
(3.19)
16.50***
(2.87)
R2 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.18
Log Likelihood 376 370 287 563 167 126 66
n 159 159 119 239 69 49 33
Notes: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Table A-5
Generalized ordered logistic regression of manifesto as a constraint on candidate behaviour.
Manifesto is a summary of valid party positions, from which candidates may
not deviate
Ordinal level positive to ambivalent ambivalent to negative
Manifesto
ManifestoLength 0.02 (0.07) 0.47* (0.23)
Candidate
Policy-centred campaigning 0.40 (0.23)
Left-right distance to own party 0.26 (0.13)
Chance to get elected 0.07 (0.13)
Female 0.15 (0.14)
Education 0.04 (0.14)
Age 0.64*** (0.13)
Party controls: included
Constant 2.54*** (0.47) 0.83 (0.45)
Pseudo R2 0.04
Pseudo LL 878
n 833
Notes: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001; Beta coefﬁcients are from a generalized ordered logistic regression.
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